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My aim in this article is to determine which kind of education enables the perpetuation of both a 
reasonable diversity of ways of life and a form of liberal democracy that accommodates this diversity. 
If schools do not provide sufficient civic education, citizens may lose the ability to coexist peacefully 
and groups with particular life modes may start to oppress or homogenise others.
1
  However, if schools 
provide a civic education that is too extensive, it may forcefully liberalise and destroy particular life 
modes—including their cultural values and morality that some argue liberal democracy depends on.2  
The question of schooling already implies that education will be based on political liberalism 
and its focus on required shared political principles and skills. It precludes a comprehensive liberal 
education that instils a liberal worldview focused on individuality or autonomy, which many liberals 
advocate (see for example Levinson, 1999; Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1995). However, political liberals 
themselves have responded to this question of schooling in different ways. Most agree that schools 
should teach a basic understanding of liberal democratic institutions, but disagree about the degree to 
which cultural, philosophical, and religious studies, as well as critical thinking skills, should be 
included in the state-mandated curriculum.
3
 Accordingly, there are three main positions in the debate 
about political liberal education. First, the general view, taken for example by John Rawls (2005), 
states that students should gain knowledge of democratic institutions, and implies that they also 
require a basic understanding of the different life modes of its citizens.
4
 Second, the activist view, 
represented by political liberals like Stephen Macedo, states that schools should provide a broader 
education about democracy and its virtues, as well as teach for a reconciliation rather than just 
understanding of different political perspectives (1995; 2000, pp. 3, 8, 6, 10-2, 167, 169, 276). Third, 
the minimalist view, endorsed by liberals such as William Galston, holds that schools should teach a 
working knowledge of democracy and the toleration that enables coexistence, but that fostering an 
appreciation or even understanding of other life modes is unnecessary (1991, pp. 119, 256; 1995, pp. 
518-9, 521, 524-9; 2002, pp. 386-91; 2003, pp. 412-29; 2005, p. 4; 2006, pp. 329, 333-4).
5
 
 Despite their different positions on education, Rawls (2005, pp. 59, 194-5) indicates that 
toleration is an important component of political liberalism on which education should be based, and 
Macedo, Galston, and other scholars all argue that schools should teach toleration.
6
 However, none of 
them carefully considers the meaning of toleration in regard to education and what it requires in terms 
of schooling. Toleration is arguably the primary means to perpetuating liberal democracy and allowing 
for a diversity of (conflicting) life modes. Here I draw out a neglected but important aspect of the 
education debate by analysing the demands that toleration places on schooling.  
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My thesis is that schools must teach students a minimal cultural and religious framework and 
critical thinking in order for them to help define liberal democracy’s limits of toleration as democratic 
citizens. I make this argument by showing the limited role of toleration in relations between citizens, 
and offering a theory about how citizens help to determine the limits of toleration by participating in 




Toleration and the Relation between Citizens 
 
Before demonstrating how the practice of toleration suggests that schools should teach students a 
minimal cultural and religious framework and critical thinking, I investigate the concept of toleration 
and its demands. I discuss and challenge the claim that toleration must be a reciprocal relation between 
equal parties. I argue that such a relation between citizens actually requires little toleration, as they 
must be taught simply to respect each other as fellow citizens without regard for each other’s life 
modes. Subsequently, I show that a nonreciprocal and unequal relation between the democratic 





BASIC DEFINITION OF TOLERATION 
Toleration is associated with the attitude of tolerance. It is a counterintuitive process. To tolerate 
means to disagree with a belief or practice, but nevertheless to refrain from rejecting it. Rejecting a 
belief or practice thus goes beyond mere disagreement or disapproval. Rejection means to (seek to) 
prevent or eliminate the belief or practice. Normally, we accept what we believe is good and reject 
what we deem wrong, but in toleration we do not reject the wrong. For example, in a contemporary 
liberal democracy a tolerant Catholic fundamentally disagrees with Protestants about religious truth, 
but still refrains from converting, harming, or persecuting them. This disagreement is what defines 
toleration. If the Catholic were indifferent to, or even appreciative of, Protestants’ beliefs and practices, 
it would not be toleration. Peter Jones (2010) indicates that in many cases such disapproval should be 
normal. Sometimes a person is shy or modest and says her beliefs are equal to others, but if she holds a 
belief that is incompatible with these others, she must naturally think hers is better and thus disapprove 
of the conflicting belief (Jones, 2010, p. 42; Forst, 2004, p. 315).  
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THE COMPLEXITY AND RELATIONS OF TOLERATION 
Beyond this basic concept of toleration, the literature about its nuances is vast. Therefore, I limit 
myself to two further observations about toleration that will be crucial to education. First, the 
complexity involved in defining the limits of toleration suggests a need for knowledge and skills. 
Second, we must consider who should make judgments about toleration and thus be educated to do so.  
To address the first point, the limits of toleration are not always clear and thus require 
knowledge of different life modes and critical thinking skills to be defined. This process of defining 
limits is especially demanding, as toleration has two boundaries rather than one boundary. The first 
boundary arises from the fact that we cannot accept or appreciate everything. If the Catholic believes 
in the Pope and Protestants do not, she cannot accept Protestants’ beliefs. However, she can still 
tolerate these beliefs. Thus, there is a boundary between acceptance and toleration. The second 
boundary arises from the fact that we cannot tolerate everything that we do not accept: certain beliefs, 
or especially the practices that result from them, are simply wrong. As we have no moral or pragmatic 
reason to tolerate them nevertheless, we must reject them. A humanist may tolerate Islamic beliefs, but 
still deem an arguably related practice like female circumcision intolerable. Thus, toleration is not 
moral relativism (see also Barry, 2001, pp. 127-8, 131, 133, 142-4; Macedo, 1995, p. 485; Tamir, 2003, 
p. 508; Parekh, 1999, p. 163). By determining what is tolerable we simultaneously determine what 
should be rejected.  
The lack of consensus on the boundaries of toleration has two implications for education. First, 
it means that individual citizens should be taught how to reason about what should and should not be 
tolerated. Second, these citizens should learn democratic participatory skills to discuss collectively the 
limits of toleration.  
To address the second point, it is important to understand the relations of toleration in order to 
understand who tolerates whom and in what capacity, which also influences what citizens should be 
taught in schools. We should note three ideas here:  
First, a prerequisite of any relation of toleration between a tolerator and the tolerated is that the 
tolerator must have the power to reject the life modes of those she is judging. If the tolerator has no 
choice but to put up with the other life modes, it is not toleration. Rejection in this context constitutes 
an action. Jones explains in more detail that ‘when we tolerate, we refrain from preventing what we 
could prevent. In fact, toleration can take the form of (a) not making people do things they are 
unwilling to do, as well as (b) not preventing their doing what they wish to do. For example, religious 
toleration includes both (a) not making people comply with religious convictions that they do not 
embrace, as well as (b) not preventing their complying with the convictions they do embrace’ (Jones, 
2010, p. 43, also 40; see also Lægaard, 2010, p. 23; Horton, 2011, p. 290). Jones’ statement thus 
affirms that toleration is not mere disapproval. Rather, toleration is the conscious act of refraining 
from rejecting a belief or practice despite disapproving of it and having the power to prevent it.  
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Second, this prerequisite of power largely explains why toleration was traditionally a vertical 
and asymmetrical relation in which a dominant group or state extended toleration to its subordinates 
(Forst, 2004, pp. 316-7; Heyd, 2008, pp. 171-94). For example, in previous centuries, monarchs in 
Europe determined which belief systems they tolerated within their territories. However, David Heyd 
(2008, pp. 171-94) and Ingrid Creppell (2008, pp. 315-59) argue that this relation is largely outdated 
and replaced by one of mutuality in which citizens or groups tolerate each other reciprocally on a 
horizontal level. This notion of the contemporary importance of horizontal toleration is supported by 
Jones, who adds more generally that ‘personal’ toleration between citizens is more prevalent than 
‘political’ toleration between institutions and citizens. ‘Indeed, for most of us, real opportunities to be 
tolerant or intolerant present themselves more frequently in our ordinary day-to-day lives than in 
formal political contexts’, he stresses (Jones, 2010, p. 45).7  Jones, Heyd, and Creppell thus suggest 
that the vertical relation of toleration plays merely a minor role in contemporary liberal democracy—if 
any. 
Third, this idea of a horizontal relation coincides with the argument that toleration must be 
reciprocal, as several scholars argue (Habermas, 2003, pp. 5, 7; Creppell, 2008, pp. 315-59; Forst, 
2004, p. 317). For example, Forst states that ‘[t]oleration can only be called for towards those who are 
tolerant; it is a matter of simple reciprocity’. He references Pierre Bayle, John Locke, Rousseau, and 
Voltaire in support of this idea (Forst, 2004, p. 313). Thus, Forst suggests that both sides must tolerate 
each other, otherwise there can be no relation of toleration. 
In sum, different scholars argue that a tolerator must have the power to reject the tolerated if 
she wishes; that horizontal toleration between individuals has largely replaced a vertical toleration 
between the state and its subjects; and that toleration must be reciprocal. I now challenge these last 
two ideas in two parts. In the remainder of this section, I demonstrate that the horizontal relation 
between citizens is determined more by respect than toleration. In the next section, I argue that the 
main relation of toleration in liberal democracy is actually still vertical and nonreciprocal, namely 
between the democratic state and its citizens. This conclusion about relations of toleration in society 
then suggests that schools must teach students political rather than interpersonal skills of toleration. 
 
 
The Relation between Citizens 
 
The foregoing discussion about toleration suggested two important points. First, despite the 
obviousness of certain tolerable and intolerable practices, determining the precise limits of toleration 
can be complex. Second, toleration in contemporary liberal democracy is primarily horizontal and 
reciprocal. The horizontal and reciprocal nature of toleration further suggests that toleration occurs 
primarily between citizens, who generally interact with many other citizens. The combination of these 
points then implies that citizens must often make complex evaluations of toleration in their daily 
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interactions with each other. For example, when a Protestant encounters veiled Muslims on the public 
bus or sees a gay couple holding hands in the city park, she would have to judge whether to tolerate 
the practices of wearing headscarves or showing homosexual affection. To make such judgments, 
citizens need knowledge about other life modes and the reasoning capacity to evaluate these 
appropriately, or so the argument would go. The conclusion then appears to be that schools must teach 
this knowledge and capacity primarily for the relations between citizens.  
However, I contend that schools should teach this cultural knowledge and reasoning for the 
purpose of toleration, but that the reason is actually different. Namely, the relation between citizens 
requires little toleration in reality. Rather, citizens must gain the capacity to make judgments of 
toleration for their participation in the democratic political process. The relation between citizens does 
not require much toleration, because liberal democracies distinguish between citizens’ public and 
private identities. In their public identities they simply need to learn to respect each other as fellow 
citizens. In addition, citizens do not have the power to reject practices of others that they interact with 
on a horizontal level. 
 
RESPECT FOR PUBLIC IDENTITIES RATHER THAN TOLERATION OF PRIVATE IDENTITIES 
Part of the reason why liberalism largely succeeds at accommodating a diversity of life modes, is 
precisely that it encourages citizens to separate their private from their public identity. This separation 
means that their different and sometimes mutually exclusive life modes do not come into direct 
confrontation, but that their public interaction is guided rather by a shared political identity. Or as 
Macedo states in his defence of political liberalism: ‘[t]he lives of liberal citizens are in a sense 
properly divided: we have a public and a private side, and the public (or political) side is guided by 
imperatives designed to make our shared life together civilized and respectful’ (2000, p. 164, also 186-
7; see also Mendus, 1988, pp. 4, 6-10; Vaughan, 2005, p. 402). Macedo’s comment implies that 
citizens should treat each other based on their public commonality rather than their private differences. 
If we return once again to our example of the Catholic and Protestants, we see how they might interact 
more peacefully if they put aside their conflicting religious claims, and cooperate in public based on 
their common citizenship. Accordingly, Habermas suggests how such a liberal separation makes 
cooperation easier by avoiding a collision of religious beliefs: ‘the normative expectation that we be 
able to live alongside those with different ethical life-styles and value-orientations is of a different 
nature than the assumption that we must accept the difference between religious truths or between 
contrary worldviews, in other words accept statements that contradict our own’ (2003, p. 12). Thus, 
citizens can avoid a confrontation of conflicting beliefs by focusing on the need to coexist peacefully 
in the public realm.  
Critics may object that it is difficult if not impossible in practice to distinguish between 
citizens’ public and private sides (see also Vaughan, 2005, p. 402; Forst, 2004, p. 319; Horton, 2011, p. 
299). After all, it may be difficult for the Catholic simply to disregard that her Protestant fellow-
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citizens misunderstand humanity’s relationship with God and even think that the saints that are so 
important to her are nothing but superstition. Here, the Catholic fails to separate her own Catholic 
beliefs from her public identity, as well as the Protestants’ beliefs from their public identities. This is a 
valid objection and, indeed, separating public and private identities is difficult. However, the objection 
should not constitute a fatalistic conclusion. Given that this separation is difficult, we should not give 
up trying to foster mutual respect among citizens at least within their public identity. Rather, the 
objection should serve as an additional reason for schools to teach students the merits of minimal civil 
respect for others—regardless of their life modes. This endeavour is especially worthwhile, as it 
fosters cooperation and social stability. Besides, as I demonstrate below, citizens have little power to 
act on private differences in their horizontal relations. Thus, the state partly forces them to treat each 
other based on their public rather than private identities. 
Once we separate public and private identities, we assign a basic respect to the public side of 
citizens that all members of society should honour (see also Dent, 1988, pp. 115-36; Lægaard, 2010, p. 
29). Religious people must thus try to limit the influence of their private beliefs on their interaction 
with other citizens and respect these others based on their shared citizenship. And Macedo (1995, p. 
487) stresses that ‘evangelical atheists’ and ‘those who espouse totalistic versions of liberalism’ must 
do the same and respect religious people publicly as citizens. Such respect differs from toleration, in 
that it is unconditional and does not require an evaluation of the other’s life mode. Habermas and 
Jones explain this distinction. ‘The right to equal respect, which everyone can demand in the life 
contexts in which his or her identity is formed as well as elsewhere, has nothing to do with the 
presumed excellence of his or her culture of origin, that is, with generally valued accomplishments’, 
states Habermas (1994, p. 129). Jones elaborates that we can define this difference between 
unconditional respect and conditional appreciation or rejection in terms of status. Status involves no 
value judgment, but is assigned to every citizen automatically. He clarifies: ‘[r]espect, as used in 
“respect for persons”, invokes an idea of status rather than merit. Thus, we may think that a person’s 
beliefs and form of life are without merit, but our respect for her status as a person can provide a 
reason why we should tolerate her beliefs and form of life in spite of our negative appraisal of them 
and even though our negative appraisal is soundly based’ (Jones, 2010, p. 45). This idea of status fits 
with the liberal idea of respecting individuals as autonomous agents who can make decisions about 
their own life modes in private (see also Raz, 1988, pp. 155-70). In fact, it is precisely because we 
respect each other’s status as fellow-citizens, that we can make private decisions about our life mode 
in our capacity as respected citizens. In the above quotation, Jones does mention toleration, but it has 
become a secondary priority. The primary principle on which relations between citizens are based is 
respect for each others’ status. We can still make judgments of toleration about others’ private sides, 
but public order and democratic cooperation succeed without such judgments—so long as mutual 
respect is maintained.  
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CITIZENS LACK POWER TO REJECT PRACTICES 
Even when a citizen evaluates others’ practices to determine whether they should be accepted, 
tolerated, or rejected, she still has little power to act on a rejection. As demonstrated above, a person 
must have the power to reject a belief or practice before she can be said to have the ability to tolerate it. 
And in liberal democracy, the state has a monopoly on force and the means to punish intolerable 
practices. Therefore, the practice of toleration is even less significant in the relation between citizens. 
In this context, it is especially surprising that Jones (2010, p. 45) argues that toleration primarily 
occurs between citizens on a personal level. After all, Jones himself states that toleration requires 
power to reject disapproved practices (2010, p. 43). 
Of course, similar to the above distinctions between public and private persons and between 
the status of a citizen and the merit of her life mode, this distinction between a powerful state and 
powerless citizens is not sharp. Some citizens do have certain power over others, such as a parent over 
a child or an employer over an employee. In addition, citizens still have minor means of rejecting 
others’ life modes. For example, a citizen has the power of persuasion and can try to change others’ 
beliefs or practices by convincing them of their wrongfulness. In addition, the mere expression of 
disapproval between citizens in the form of public opinion could influence what is tolerated or rejected 
between them (Jones, 2010, pp. 44-5). Related to this idea of public opinion is the ability of groups of 
citizens to ostracise individuals whose life mode they reject. Or stated in the example of the Catholic: 
she has power to try and persuade Protestants to correct their error of not believing in the Pope; she 
can form a group of Catholics and increase social pressure on Protestants through public opinion to 
motivate them to change their beliefs; or she can exclude Protestants from this group in an effort to 
show them the merits of changing their beliefs and gaining group entry. However, these powers of an 
individual citizen and her associated group remain limited. After all, the success of persuasion depends 
on whether the other party becomes convinced, and the power of social ostracism is limited by anti-
discrimination laws.  
In short, despite limited means of acting against different life modes, citizens have little power 
vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. Therefore, the responsibility to prevent or remove intolerable practices 
in society rests with the state rather than the individual citizen. 
 
The main point here is that, because respect is the primary means to enabling peaceful coexistence 
between citizens and these citizens have little power to reject practices, toleration plays only a minor 
role in the horizontal relation between them. Therefore, schools need not teach students the cultural 
knowledge and skills to make complex evaluations of toleration for their engagement with others. 
However, I now demonstrate that schools should teach students the ability to make such evaluations, 
but for the purpose of democratic participation.  
 
 








We saw that citizens have relatively little need for toleration among themselves. However, they must 
maintain common limits of toleration; otherwise they risk two scenarios.  
The first would be an anarchical system of toleration in which each citizen defines her own 
limits of toleration, which are not reciprocal and therefore toleration soon fails. After all, if a Muslim 
tolerates a Catholic wearing a cross in a public workplace, but Muslims wearing headscarves to work 
is beyond the limit of toleration for the Catholic, the Muslim might soon become intolerant of the 
Catholic’s practice. This anarchical system of toleration may cause a downward spiral of intolerance, 
in which citizens no longer tolerate other life modes and each merely tries to use power to promote her 
own practices.  
The second would be a situation of moral relativism in which even harmful practices are 
tolerated.
8
 Here, the Muslim or Catholic might judge that she cannot legitimately evaluate other life 
modes from within her belief, or that the best strategy for perpetuating her life mode is to refrain from 
criticising others—to ‘live and let live’.  
As the first scenario results in widespread intolerance and the second in moral relativism, 
citizens need shared limits of toleration.
9
  
The idea of shared limits suggests that people must agree on what constitutes reasonable 
disagreement. Therefore, these limits are reciprocal.
10
 For example, they might agree to allow all 
religious symbols in schools, but disallow practices that interfere with school time such as prayer—or 
ban symbols altogether. To make toleration work and avoid intolerance or moral relativism, citizens 
must reciprocally honour this agreement. Thus, they need common limits of toleration that all respect 
reciprocally. But this poses a problem: how are these limits determined if not through horizontal 
interactions? 
 Scholars rarely answer this question directly. They often discuss the boundaries of toleration, 
but few specify how these boundaries are actually drawn. The best descriptions of drawing these 
boundaries are found in what I term the ‘justification approach’ and the ‘evaluation approach’.  
The justification approach is represented by Rainer Forst. According to this approach, the 
limits of toleration depend on the higher principle of public justification. To apply this principle, it 
distinguishes vertical toleration—the ‘permission conception of toleration’—from horizontal 
toleration—the ‘respect conception’. In the permission conception, the majority defines the limits of 
toleration arbitrarily and therefore these limits are unjust. In contrast, in the respect conception, 
citizens create mutually acceptable limits of toleration by reciprocally refraining from shaping these 
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limits according to their personal life modes. Hence the limits of toleration are publicly justifiable. The 
reciprocity of this model provides the political justice on which toleration is based (Forst, 2004, 314-8).
 
 
The evaluation approach is advocated by Bhikhu Parekh. In contrast to the justification 
approach, its account of how the limits of toleration are defined is more realistic in that it assumes that 
power relations in society are unequal. It states that society should decide which practices to tolerate 
based on its ‘operative public values’. These values are defined in society’s constitution, its laws, and 
the ‘civic relations’ between its people. The values evolved historically and continue to change 
through public dialogue. Unlike the public justification principle, the operative public values 
‘articulate a specific conception of the good life’ (Parekh, 1999, pp. 168-75). Important to note is that 
the evaluation approach implies that toleration is still predominantly a vertical relation of power in 
which an authority extends toleration to the practices of subordinates. Even though the approach 
indicates that the operative public values are partly defined in constitutional and regular laws, it does 
not indicate how these laws emerged. 
 I have critiqued these approaches in more detail elsewhere, arguing that they respectively 
understate and overstate the influence of citizens’ life modes in determining the common limits of 
toleration; that the idea of toleration as restraint of power is too limited in the justification approach; 
and that both approaches remain too abstract (Anonymous for peer review, 2012). Yet most important 
to note here is that neither the justification nor evaluation approach demonstrates how the limits of 
toleration are primarily defined in liberal democracy—through democratic legislation. Politicians may 
use abstract models for inspiration, but ultimately politics is a process of debate, negotiation, 
compromise, and voting. And as society’s limits of toleration are predominantly defined through its 
different kinds of laws, the process of determining these limits is marked by democratic negotiation in 
which politicians advocate, or are at least influenced by, the life modes of themselves and of their 
constituents. Citizens hold opinions largely based on their life modes, and elect the representatives 
who legislate. In contemporary liberal democracy, this legislation largely defines the limits of 
toleration. It is also this democratic process that continuously (re)defines the laws that represent a 
dominant part of the operative public values of the evaluation approach. However, neither the 
justification nor evaluation approach discusses that individual citizens have democratic power to 
influence indirectly decisions concerning the limits of toleration. Therefore, neither of them considers 
what knowledge or skills these citizens must have and connects toleration to education. 
Finally, the purpose of these abstract approaches differs from ours. We seek to find out how 
individual citizens practise toleration concretely in order to understand the education they require. The 
justification and evaluation approaches are largely normative descriptions of how the limits of 
toleration should be determined. By contrast, we first seek a more descriptive understanding of how 
those limits are determined and how citizens are involved in this process, before we consider how 
schools should normatively educate citizens to support a tolerant liberal democracy. After all, if we 
used merely normative theories that describe a perfectly tolerant society, there might be little need for 
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civic education. Yet part of the problem that we are trying to solve with education is that liberal 
democracy is not perfectly tolerant and that the common limits of toleration are disputed. 
Consequently, I supplement the above approaches with a more concrete understanding of toleration 
through democratic politics below.  
 
 
Defining the Limits of Toleration through Democratic Politics 
 
So far, we discovered that a sense of justice and toleration and the evaluation of cultural and religious 
practices must be important elements in the process of defining the limits of toleration. However, we 
still do not know what particular role citizens play in this process and therefore we cannot yet 
conclude what their civic education should entail. Consequently, we must consider how the limits of 
toleration are determined concretely—through democratic politics. Namely, in contrast to what the 
scholars mentioned earlier contend about the transition from vertical to horizontal toleration, we still 
have an important vertical relation of toleration in modern democracy—between the democratic state 
and its citizens (Creppell, 2008, pp. 315-59; Heyd, 2008, pp. 171-94). This vertical relation is even 
more important than the horizontal relation between citizens, as the state continuously (re)defines the 
limits of toleration and has the power to sanction transgressors. The state (re)defines these limits 
through the laws that it creates. As the democratic state represents its citizens, these citizens also play 
a role in determining the extent of its toleration. It may seem logical that the ongoing modification of 
the limits of toleration largely occurs through the democratic legislative process, but earlier we saw 
that this view is not as prevalent or clear in the toleration literature as we might expect. Therefore, I 
investigate democratic politics and the role of citizens in determining the scope of toleration here, so 
that we can conclude what schools must teach citizens for their role in this process. 
 At this point, it may seem that there is little toleration to salvage with democratic politics. 
After all, we established that liberal democracy requires a form of reciprocal toleration to avoid moral 
relativism or a downward spiral of increasing intolerance. Subsequently, we seemed to lose this 
reciprocity by largely abandoning the idea of horizontal toleration between citizens. The justification 
approach briefly appeared to save reciprocity with its idea that citizens should reciprocally refrain 
from imposing their life mode in public. But then we mostly abandoned this reciprocity as well. 
However, we still have one form of reciprocity left. Namely, citizens must reciprocally respect the 
laws that define the limits of toleration in society. This idea sounds similar to that of the justification 
approach, but the difference is that these laws are determined through debate and negotiation in 
democratic politics—rather than a thought experiment in which all parties consent to laws without 
invoking their life modes. The reciprocal standard of toleration that we are left with is thus not 
reciprocally just in its origin: it is not determined neutrally, but through a combination of unequal 
influences of different life modes. It is merely reciprocally just in that it applies to all citizens equally. 
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Democratic representatives create a law and enforce it with authority. Yet once the law is enacted, all 
citizens must respect the limit of toleration that it sets. Consequently, the law prevents moral 
relativism or a downward spiral of intolerance.  
We now have to answer two important questions in the next two sections. First, how does a 
representative democracy define the limits of toleration through its laws? Second, how are citizens 




The Legal Limits of Toleration 
 
In liberal democracy, representatives, acting on behalf of citizens, largely determine the limits of 
toleration through state laws. Earlier we saw that the limits of toleration are also enforced through 
methods such as public opinion and social ostracism, but toleration is primarily about what the state 
accepts and does not accept. It expresses this acceptance or rejection through laws, which sanction 
certain practices and prohibit others. Such prohibition is enforced through legal prosecution, penalties, 
and imprisonment. The legal limits of toleration do not always correspond exactly with the practices 
that representatives deem rejectable: sometimes intolerant practices are legally tolerated for other 
moral or pragmatic reasons.
11
 Finally, I note that laws only indicate what a democratic state—often a 
type of majority or coalition of legislators that represent citizens—deems rejectable rather than 
unobjectionable or tolerable. Laws thus only indicate the outer boundary of toleration between the 
zones of tolerable and rejectable practices; not the inner boundary between tolerable and 
unobjectionable practices. Within the sphere of legalised practices, individual citizens can thus choose 
whether to approve or disapprove of particular practices—but the law indicates which practices almost 
all of them agree are rejectable. Following this elementary outline of the process of democratically 
determining the limits of toleration, I now examine in which situations laws affect the limits of 
toleration. 
When representatives legislate, they define the limits of toleration both directly and indirectly 
in different situations. These situations interrelate, but we can divide them into three broad categories. 
In the first situation, representatives directly express the opinion that the state should reject 
particular practices that most citizens deem intolerable. For example, representatives might want the 
state to prohibit female circumcision or forced marriages, simply because they think these cultural 
practices are intolerable. They therefore create a law that states that female circumcision is illegal, 
which means that the practice is no longer tolerated. Here, representatives modify the limits of 
toleration proactively. Some representatives will judge practices in this category to violate the harm 
principle (so long as a person does not harm anyone, she should be free to think or do as she wishes) 
(Mill, 2002, pp. 11-3; see also Raz, 1988, pp. 155-70; Parekh, 1999, p. 165). Therefore, they might 
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argue that the practices should not even be up for consideration, but should simply fall under the 
prohibition of practices that violate constitutional rights. 
In the second situation, a shift in the limits of toleration may result from a reinterpretation of 
these constitutional rights. The constitution plays a primary role in the definition of the limits of 
toleration, as it provides citizens with individual rights that no cultural or religious practices may 
infringe. For example, parents may not invoke religious reasons to prevent their child from receiving 
life-saving medication, because it would violate the child’s individual rights. More generally, the basic 
rights of life and freedom of conscience prevent practices such as ritual sacrifice of human life and the 
forceful conversion of people who do not share one’s beliefs. Thus, constitutional individual rights 
place a basic limit on the toleration of cultural and religious practices. However, constitutional rights 
are only generic formulations that representatives and judges must interpret. Such reinterpretation may 
be sparked by an event. For example, a debate about the constitutional rights to freedom of speech and 
conscience emerged when an imam in the Netherlands called homosexuality a disease at a Friday 
worship at a mosque. Many citizens and politicians argued that the imam was violating the principle of 
non-discrimination. However, critics objected that the imam merely expressed his belief, which is 
protected from state intervention through the freedom of conscience and freedom of speech. However, 
in expressing his belief at the Friday worship, he arguably incited others to engage in the practice of 
discriminating against homosexuals. Consequently, there was a public discussion about the extent of 
the constitutional freedoms of speech and religion, as well as anti-discrimination laws—and thus the 
extent of toleration (NRC, 2004). Such debates among citizens can lead to democratic protests, 
petitions, and the election of democratic parties that advocate certain positions on the issue (we return 
to the question of citizen participation in the next section). If these parties are elected, they might then 
tighten or extend laws that specify the application of the above constitutional rights, which in turn 
redefines the limits of toleration.  
However, the interpretation of constitutional rights is notoriously controversial. For example, 
Jones emphasises that the meaning of what constitutes religion differs among citizens. Religious 
citizens may have a different understanding of the meaning and scope of religion, and therefore the 
application of laws about religion, from non-believers. Jones (2010) indicates that ‘even if all parties 
to the conflict agree that mutual toleration is their best option, their disagreement may still infect their 
thinking about what the limits of that toleration should be. Consider the case of religious faith. Both 
believers and non-believers may readily accept that each should be free to live according to their own 
faith or lack of faith, but they may still disagree about what that requires precisely’ (p. 46). He 
elaborates that defining common boundaries of toleration is difficult, since they are the point of 
contention to begin with: ‘a difference that one person sees as merely cultural may be a matter of 
religious truth for another’ (Jones, 2010, p. 52).12 If Jones is correct that citizens interpret the meaning 
of concepts like religion differently, it will indeed be difficult to find commonly accepted 
interpretations of constitutional law and thus the limits of toleration.  
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In the third situation, the limits of toleration are affected indirectly through more ‘neutral’ 
laws that seek to regulate uncontroversial aspects of society. Let us consider two examples of this 
indirect impact. First, the Dutch state recently intended to regulate against animal cruelty and therefore 
considered prohibiting certain slaughter methods. However, Muslims and Jews require their animals to 
be slaughtered in certain traditional ways. Consequently, the regulation would have had an indirect 
adverse effect on the practices of Muslim and Jewish citizens and therefore they successfully protested 
against the law (Soeters, 2011). In this case, a state law might have had the effect of decreasing state 
toleration of two religions by prohibiting—and thus placing beyond the limits of toleration—their 
religious practices of slaughter. Second, we can think of the American state of Wisconsin, which 
created a law that children must attend school at least until the age of sixteen. The law meant to ensure 
that all citizens would achieve a basic level of education. However, Amish parents challenged it 
successfully, claiming that schooling beyond grade eight would hinder their practice of instilling the 
Amish life mode in their children.
13
 Thus, here the state had placed a cultural practice beyond the 
limits of toleration through an education law that prevented the exercise of that practice.  
In addition to these cases, there are situations in which the state does mean to limit religious 
practices through laws, but these laws inadvertently disadvantage certain believers over others. For 
example, the French principle of laїcité, the strict separation of religion and state, mandates that public 
schools must be free from religious symbols. However, the Christian faith does not require its 
adherents to wear such symbols, whereas Islam arguably requires girls to wear headscarves. In the 
case of conservative Muslim families, the effect is that they do not allow their daughters to attend 
public school. Thus, the law significantly affects certain Muslim citizens by disallowing their practice 
of wearing headscarves in public school. Despite the state’s lack of intention to hinder practices of 
particular citizens, sometimes it might have no option but to make a law that hinders or rejects such 
practices. And in doing so, the state no longer tolerates these practices. Thus, if there is no option but 
to create a law that has adverse effects on a life mode, the state by necessity infringes on particular 
practices. Here we can think of the example of polygamous marriage: if the state legalises polygamous 
marriage, it accommodates certain Mormons, but voids the institution of marriage for conservative 
Protestants (for whom the essence of marriage is that it is a union between one man and one woman). 
Or if it prohibits polygamous marriage, it accommodates Protestants but makes impossible the 
Mormon practice of polygamous marriage. Thus, all four cases show that even ‘neutral’ laws can 
affect the scope of toleration in liberal democracy. 
In short, in a liberal democracy, elected representatives define the scope of tolerated practices 
in three (overlapping) situations. First, they intentionally reject intolerable practices. Second, they 
define laws that specify more particularly constitutional rights and freedoms. Third, they enact ‘neutral 
laws’ for the everyday functioning of society that indirectly affect whether or not cultural practices are 
tolerated. Let us now consider to what extent citizens are involved in this democratic process of 
defining the limits of toleration and thus what schools should educate them for. 





The Required Role and Knowledge of Citizens 
 
So far, we have seen that in the vertical relation of toleration between the state and its citizens, 
representatives largely define the limits of toleration through laws. These representatives do not have 
free reign in enacting laws. They are limited by the constitution and its precedent. This precedent is 
determined by judges, who also modify the scope of toleration by adjudicating on court cases that 
involve, for example, the freedom of conscience or religion.  
However, citizens also play a role in this process of determining the limits of toleration. That 
is, democracy is government by the people, even if it functions indirectly through representatives and 
judges. Citizens are responsible for electing representatives and holding them accountable. In addition, 
they can influence decisions that representatives make with respect to toleration through protests, 
writing petitions, writing opinion pieces, and organising themselves into lobbies. Finally, citizens can 
take to court cases involving questions of toleration. Overall, citizens play a limited but important role 
in shaping the limits of toleration. But do they require particular knowledge for their political 
participation? Let us consider this question in two parts. First, do citizens require particular knowledge 
to form opinions on which practices the state should tolerate? Second, do they need certain knowledge 
to translate their opinions into electing representatives and expressing their views politically? 
In response to the first question about forming political opinions, it might be argued that 
citizens could just endorse the political position that their life mode prescribes. However, many 
citizens do not have a coherent life mode and thus hold conflicting beliefs. In addition, life modes do 
not prescribe positions on all issues. For example, the Protestant church might tell its members that it 
is against their faith to endorse same sex marriage, but will not have an opinion about whether Jews 
should be allowed to slaughter animals in a certain way. 
 Subsequently, it might be contended that, since legal toleration is about practices, neither 
citizens nor their representatives require knowledge about beliefs associated with those practices. This 
reasoning comes back to the harm principle: the state must simply allow practices that cause no harm, 
but prohibit ones that do—regardless of the associated religious or cultural meaning. In the case of 
clear harm, this is largely true. Murdering citizens should be prohibited, regardless of cultural or 
religious motivations a murderer might have.  
However, we saw that often the meaning of harm is controversial. In determining whether a 
practice is harmful, it sometimes helps to consider its religious or cultural motivation. For example, 
the Muslim demand that girls wear headscarves in schools may seem oppressive when compared to 
the treatment of boys. However, some argue that within the girls’ cultural framework it is in fact 
liberating. It is religiously meaningful to the girls and actually improves their equality vis-à-vis boys, 
as they are no longer judged by appearance. Such an argument may not persuade other citizens, but it 
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could still influence their opinion and the details of laws on religious symbols in schools. Thus, the 
meaning behind practices offers an initial argument that citizens require knowledge of other life modes 
when they form political opinions.  
The evaluation approach offers another reason why knowledge of others’ beliefs should matter 
for the interpretation of their practices. It states that, for citizens with particular beliefs, certain 
practices are obligatory and therefore we cannot expect them to abandon them as easily as other 
citizens could. Parekh compares these beliefs to laws themselves: ‘cultural practices are part of a way 
of life, have a normative authority and are generally regarded as binding by the members of the 
community concerned. In this respect they are somewhat like the laws of a country. We may 
disapprove of a law and yet obey it out of respect for the authority enacting it or for the way of life of 
which it is a part. Cultural practices cannot therefore be judged exclusively in terms of their content’ 
(1999, p. 163). Parekh thus concludes that we should judge a practice differently based on its 
obligatory nature within a life mode. He provides the example of Rastafarians and ‘AmerIndians’, for 
whom a certain use of drugs is a ‘requirement of their way of life’, and ‘white adolescents’ for whom 
it is ‘a self-chosen action’ (Parekh, 1999, p. 163). Again, the fact that life modes prescribe practices 
does not mean that the state should allow these practices. But it is important that citizens at least know 
what life modes actually demand of others before forming a political opinion about their practices. 
 In addition to the alleged possibility of separating beliefs and practices, it may seem that 
citizens still need not learn about other life modes proactively. Namely, once a life mode is threatened 
by a law, its adherents will publicly advocate the importance of their practices in an effort to save them 
from prohibition. After all, in a democracy that depends on public debate through the freedom of 
speech, citizens can pronounce the needs of their life modes. Thus, others need not know about these 
modes before a controversial issue arises. Again, this is partly true. In fact, because citizens simply 
cannot know everything about other life modes, they actually depend on information that adherents to 
those modes provide.  
In response to the second question about expressing views politically, we find an answer 
similar to the first. Namely, citizens require some political and cultural knowledge to elect and assess 
representatives. In liberal democracies in which judges are also elected, as for example in twenty-three 
US states, citizens must even assess the qualities of judges. Citizens must evaluate the claims that 
political parties and their candidates make during political campaigns and while in office. They do not 
require extensive knowledge of a political party. Rather, to elect a party and hold it accountable, they 
can rely mostly on information that political parties and the media provide.
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Overall, citizens do not inherently require a deep knowledge of different life modes and their 
practices. Generally, they can form opinions about cultural practices and political parties over time. 
And once they have knowledge and an opinion of larger moral issues such as abortion or same sex 
marriage, they can vote for a political party that supports their view—or stage a protest to voice their 
opinion if there are no parties representing their view. Subsequently, they will have an entire election 
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cycle to reconsider their opinions and the weight that particular issues carry for them. After all, 
political candidates and parties advocate a diversity of issues which do not line up precisely with 
citizens’ opinions. Therefore, in addition to assessing claims about cultural practices, citizens need to 
weigh the importance of these issues vis-à-vis social, economic, and other concerns. Only rarely are 
citizens expected to express suddenly their opinion about a specific issue of toleration. For example, in 
2009, Swiss citizens were asked to vote in a referendum on the question of whether Muslims should be 
allowed to construct minarets as part of their mosques. Swiss citizens thus received information about 
the issue from different politicians and the media, formed an opinion, and cast a vote (they voted in 
favour of a prohibition) (BBC News, 2009). 
Having analysed the formation and expression of political opinions with respect to toleration, 
we can now draw a conclusion on how toleration affects the educational requirements of liberal 
democracy. However, at this point, critics might make two objections. First, citizens do not require the 
knowledge about life modes and political parties stated above, because they are not obliged to take 
into account any consideration of toleration. Second, even if citizens should take toleration into 
consideration, we have just seen that adherents of life modes, politicians, and the media can provide 
the information that citizens need in order to do so and therefore there is no need for schooling. 
Descriptively, these objections are partially valid. However, normatively, we are trying to discover 
how to maintain a tolerant liberal democracy. In other words: we do not merely want to know how 
citizens receive biased information in daily life and voice political opinions that might factually 
influence the limits of toleration. Rather, we want to know how we maintain a society in which 
citizens make critical evaluations about the limits of toleration and representatives based on a desire 






In this article I set out to determine which kind of education enables the perpetuation of a reasonable 
diversity of life modes and the form of liberal democracy that accommodates these modes. 
We saw that political liberals argue for a minimal civic education that provides procedural 
knowledge of the liberal democratic system, while leaving cultural and religious groups enough room 
to teach coherently their beliefs and practices to their children. However, these liberals disagree about 
the extent to which schools should teach about different life modes and the ability to reflect on them. I 
broadly distinguished between three positions: (1) the general view as represented by Rawls; (2) the 
activist view as illustrated by Macedo; and (3) the minimalist view as defended by Galston. I noted 
that, despite their different positions, these authors mention the need for teaching toleration without 
analysing its particular implications in regard to schooling. As toleration is arguably the primary 
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means to perpetuating liberal democracy and accommodating its diversity, I investigated the 
educational demands of toleration. I analysed the concept of toleration and stated that, in contrast to 
what Heyd, Creppell, and Jones argue, toleration is not practised primarily between citizens. Citizens 
mostly treat each other based on the idea of mutual respect. However, citizens require common limits 
of toleration; otherwise they might fall into a downward spiral of intolerance or a situation of moral 
relativism in which even harmful practices are tolerated. Consequently, I indicated that the best 
descriptions of how the boundaries of toleration are drawn are offered by the justification approach 
and evaluation approach, and supplemented these approaches with a theory about how democratic 
politics defines the limits of toleration. I concluded that contemporary liberal democracies still have an 
important vertical relation of toleration between the democratic state and its citizens—and that these 
citizens must sometimes contribute to the process of defining the limits of toleration through state laws. 
We now return to the theoretical education debate.  
Throughout this article, we have seen that toleration requires civic education that is more 
demanding than the minimalist political liberal education, but less demanding than the activist 
education. The minimalist position is correct in that a liberal democracy that seeks to accommodate 
diversity can only mandate schools to teach toleration. Yet teaching toleration requires more curricular 
engagement with different life modes and critical reflection than Galston acknowledges. In addition, it 
requires teaching respect for democratic institutions, because citizens need to be able to participate in 
the democratic process of determining the limits of toleration, which also affect their own practices. 
These demands suggest that the general and activist positions fit better with teaching toleration. 
However, the activist position is too demanding, because toleration does not require a broad liberal 
institutional effort to foster more appreciation and cooperation between citizens with different life 
modes. Nor does toleration require a transformation of their values or mandated common schooling. 
After all, if liberal democracy intends to accommodate its diversity of (conflicting) life modes through 
toleration, it cannot expect students to develop a more positive recognition of beliefs and practices that 
conflict with their own, or to transform their beliefs so that they will agree more with others.
15
  
Overall, the schooling required for toleration approximates the general position. It corresponds 
to Rawls’ contention that schools must teach students how to participate in the democratic process 
and—according to Callan and Costa’s persuasive interpretation of this position—expose them to 
different life modes. The exposure to life modes that the general position advocates is primarily based 
on the idea that different citizens must learn to cooperate and reciprocate horizontally. In contrast, 
schooling for toleration includes this minimal exposure to enable citizens to interpret political 
information and make judgments about vertical toleration between the state and its citizens. However, 
despite its slightly different reasons, teaching for toleration largely supports the general position in the 
political liberal education debate.  
Nevertheless, critics may object that once civic education includes even minimal exposure to 
different life modes and critical thinking, it may lead to the de facto transformation of students’ values 
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that Macedo advocates or even the critical attitude towards their own life mode that comprehensive 
liberals endorse. Such critical self-reflection harms the efforts of groups to perpetuate their life 
modes.
16
 However, this slippery slope need not exist. It seems plausible enough that students can learn 
a basic knowledge of other life modes without scrutinising their own.
17
 Besides, they do not need to 
learn to see other life modes as alternative truths or choices for themselves, but rather as beliefs and 
practices that matter greatly to fellow citizens and therefore might deserve to be tolerated. 
I conclude that schools should teach minimal cultural and religious understanding and critical 
thinking to enable citizens to participate in the democratic process of defining the limits of toleration 
in society. A consideration of toleration neither exempts schools from teaching a diversity of life 
modes and critical thinking, nor mandates them to teach these extensively. Citizens must gain minimal 
background knowledge of other life modes and the reflective skills to evaluate whether cultural or 
religious practices should be accepted, tolerated, or rejected. They should learn to make such 
evaluations not primarily among themselves, but in helping to define the limits of toleration in society 
through their participation in the democratic process.  
This conclusion has important ramifications. The educational requirements of toleration 
indicate the balancing point that liberal democracy must maintain if it seeks to accommodate diversity. 
A broader civic education would hurt the ability of groups with particular life modes to perpetuate 
those life modes. A more minimal civic education might endanger the perpetuation of liberal 
democracy itself, as citizens with different life modes would lack a respect for democracy and liberal 
rights and the ability to coexist peacefully.  
Looking ahead, we must now conduct empirical research to find the most appropriate manner 
to satisfy the educational demands of toleration. I provided an idea of the required content of civic 
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1
 The term ‘life mode’ is similar to the concepts of ‘comprehensive doctrine’ and ‘conception of the good’ that 
Rawls (2005) uses. However, I prefer life mode, as it encompasses not only the variety of doctrines, religions, 
and cultures, but also their related practices, that we find in pluralist societies and can cause division and the 
need for (legal) accommodation of diversity. 
2
 For the argument that liberal democracy implicitly depends on particular cultural values and morals, see 
Galston (1991, p. 9), Walzer (1994, pp. 4-21). For another discussion of this argument, see also Forst (2004, pp. 
319-20). 
3
 Although it seems relatively uncontroversial among liberals to have schools teach at least some minimal 
knowledge of other beliefs, Stolzenberg (1993, pp. 583, 585) indicates that fundamentalist Christians ‘have 
asserted that the teaching of diverse viewpoints in a tolerant and objective mode threatens the survival of their 
culture’, and have even argued that it violates their right to free exercise of religion. For the scholarly argument 
that civic education requires little or no exposure to different life modes, see for example Burtt (2003, p. 203). 
4
 Based on Rawls’ belief that just democratic and judicial institutions tend to instil democratic principles and 
allegiance in citizens, Costa (2004, pp. 5-6) argues that Rawls relies on a more minimal civic education than 
other political liberals. However, despite Rawls’ lack of clear educational guidelines, Costa (2004, p. 9) and 
Callan (1997, pp. 26-39) infer from his political liberalism that schooling should include an exposure to different 
life modes, otherwise children cannot learn to reciprocate and cooperate civically as Rawls desires. 
5
 I use Rawls, Macedo, and Galston as models for the three positions, because they are the most cited scholars in 
the debate according to an analysis of the scholarship on citizenship education in Fernández and Sundström 
(2011, p. 379). 
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6
 For other scholars arguing for the need to teach toleration, see for example Shorten (2010, pp. 57-72),  
Weinstock (2004, p. 114). Even The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘[e]ducation…shall 
promote…tolerance’ (United Nations General Assembly, n.d.). For the argument that political liberal education 
should primarily focus on teaching students that they have the ‘right to exit’ from their cultural and religious 
groups (rather than on toleration), see also Lester (2006, pp. 612-35). 
7
 For the argument that ‘group identity’ might be replaced by more individualism in post modernity, which 
supports the idea that there will be more horizontal toleration between individuals rather than vertical toleration 
between dominant groups and subordinate groups, see also Orlie (1999, p. 141). 
8
 For the argument about moral relativism that ‘[t]oleration ceases to be good when it embraces conduct or states 
of affairs that lie beyond the tolerable’, see Jones (2010, p. 47). Barry (2001, pp. 131-3) argues that Kukathas’ 
account of toleration in fact constitutes such ‘moral anarchy’. 
9
 For an argument about the need for such common limits of toleration, see also Habermas (2003, pp. 5-6). 
10
 For discussions about the need for reciprocity in toleration and the idea of ‘reasonable disagreement’, see 
Habermas (2003, pp. 5-6), Jones (2010, pp. 48, 52), and Macedo (2000, p. 171). 
11
 For more about other moral and pragmatic reasons to refrain from prohibiting a practice legally, see Forst 
(2004, pp. 321-2), Jones (2010, p. 40), and Heyd (1996, pp. 3-4). 
12
 For more about the subjectivity and incommensurability of cultural norms and definitions, see also Williams 
and Waldron (2008, p. 13). 
13
 For the theoretical debate about the Amish court case Wisconsin v. Yoder, see also Gutmann (1995, pp. 565-76) 
and Galston (1995). 
14
 For an argument about which knowledge and characteristics a citizen in a liberal democracy must have to elect 
representatives, see also Barry (2001, pp. 212-3). 
15
 The issue of teaching recognition rather than respect or toleration constitutes another ongoing debate among 
theorists. See for example Jones (2010), Lægaard (2010; 2008, pp. 291-314), Horton (2011, pp. 290-303), 
Taylor (1994), Wolf (1994, p. 78), Fullinwider (2003, pp. 487-500), and Habermas (1994). 
16
 For an explanation of this slippery slope argument, see also Kymlicka (1995, pp. 107-30, 152-72; 2002, pp. 
208-83, Gutmann (1995, p. 573), Vaughan (2005, p. 404). 
17
 For the argument that minimal exposure to other life modes and minimal critical thinking skills need not lead 
to a critical stance towards one’s own life mode, see also Appiah (2003, p. 72) and Heyd (1996, p. 15).  
